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A GRAND SLAM OF PROFESSIONAL 
IRRESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL DISREGARD 
Stephen A. Saltzburg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Professor Monroe H. Freedman has devoted his professional life to 
studying and enhancing the professional ethics of lawyers. He has 
received the American Bar Association’s highest award for 
professionalism, in recognition of a “lifetime of original and influential 
scholarship in the field of lawyers’ ethics.”1 The New York Times 
described him as “a pioneer in the field of legal ethics,”2 which he 
certainly is. From 1975, when he published his treatise Lawyers’ Ethics 
in an Adversary System,3 to last year when he co-authored 
Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics,4 he has asked questions others preferred 
to avoid5 and endeavored to assure that lawyers throughout the legal 
profession develop and adhere to high standards.6 
                                                          
 * Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University Professor, George Washington University 
School of Law. 
 1. Professor Freedman won the ABA Michael Franck Award for Professional Responsibility 
in 1998. See American Bar Association Michael Franck Award, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mfranck_winner_bios.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). 
 2. David Margolick, Like Sex Acts, Lawyer’s Job is a Matter of Definition, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 26, 1998, at B7. 
 3. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975). The year 
after it was published the book received the ABA Gavel Award Certificate of Merit as an 
“outstanding” contribution to the field. 
 4. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (3rd ed. 
2004). 
 5. Perhaps the most well known example is Monroe H. Freedman, Professional 
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 
1469, 1469 (1966). 
 6. One writer describes Professor Freedman as the primary creative force in legal ethics 
today. Ralph J. Temple, Monroe Freedman and Legal Ethics: A Prophet in His Own Time, 13 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 233, 233-34 (1988). 
  
784 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:783 
Despite Professor Freedman’s efforts, too many examples of bad 
lawyering and indifferent judicial responses to bad lawyering arise to 
give comfort to those of us who seek to raise the standards of 
professional conduct and assure adequate legal representation for all 
clients. 
I have selected one case to illustrate just how poor the performance 
of lawyers can be and how largely indifferent judges often are to such 
performances. It is a death penalty prosecution. With the defendant’s life 
on the line, it appears that the prosecutor acted unprofessionally and 
disregarded the constitutional right of the defendant in a capital case to 
rely on mitigation evidence, the defense counsel failed in his 
responsibility to protect the defendant from the prosecutor’s improper 
conduct, the trial judge failed to correct the prosecutor’s conduct or to 
take measures to assure that conduct did not prejudice the defendant, and 
the California Supreme Court (and to some extent the United States 
Supreme Court) pretended that nothing untoward had occurred. 
Throughout almost a quarter-century of litigation, only two justices on 
the California Supreme Court and eight federal habeas corpus judges 
actually recognized that the defendant’s rights had been violated.7 
Although one federal district court judge and a closely divided en banc 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would have granted 
relief to the defendant, they were dealing with the current state of federal 
habeas corpus.8 In the end, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the lower federal courts did not adequately defer to the state courts under 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).9 
The case to which I refer is the prosecution of William Charles 
Payton who was tried for rape, murder and attempted murder in 1981.10 
The facts of the case, like the facts of most capital cases, are gruesome. 
Little reason appears in the reported opinions to question Payton’s guilt 
                                                          
 7. As explained below, the federal district judge would have overturned a death sentence. On 
appeal, two of the three judges on the panel that originally heard the case would have reversed. 
None of the three judges on the panel sat en banc when the court divided 6-5. Thus, of the fourteen 
circuit judges who reviewed the case, seven would have affirmed the death sentence and seven 
would have overturned it. Payton v. Woodward, 258 F.3d 905, 926 (9th Cir. 2001); People v. 
Payton, 839 P.2d 1035, 1054 (Cal. 1992). 
 8. Payton v. Woodward, 258 F.3d at 914. 
 9. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (1996). When a habeas petitioner’s claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state-court 
proceedings, as a result of AEDPA a federal court may not grant relief unless the state court’s 
adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). 
 10. People v. Payton, 839 P.2d at 1038-39. 
  
2006] PROFESSIONAL IRRESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL DISREGARD 785 
of the crimes charged. Indeed, he put on no defense evidence at the guilt 
stage of the proceedings. The adversarial contest arose during the 
sentencing phase, when the defense sought to avoid a death sentence for 
Payton. 
As long as the death penalty remains a constitutionally valid 
punishment, Payton’s crimes and criminal record are such that the 
imposition of capital punishment on him would not appear to be an 
abuse of the penalty. But, before the ultimate sanction is imposed upon 
any person, basic notions of fairness suggest that the sentencing 
proceeding should be fair and the defendant’s rights should be 
adequately protected. As I explain below, this was not the case for 
Payton. According to the reported opinions, none of the legally trained 
professionals at trial did what professional standards required of them.11 
The prosecutor acted improperly, defense counsel failed to respond 
appropriately, and the trial judge acted as though nothing improper had 
happened. Three lawyers, all professionals, knowing that life and death 
hung in the balance, failed to meet their professional responsibilities. At 
least that is so if the reported decisions describe accurately what 
occurred at trial. 
In this Article, I rely upon the reported decisions and assume that 
their descriptions of trial events are accurate, because the courts treated 
these facts as accurate as they rendered decisions. They upheld Payton’s 
death penalty on the basis of the factual description they provided. My 
conclusion is that the professionals at trial breached their 
responsibilities, one and all; the California Supreme Court failed to 
appreciate the extent of the breaches and affirmed the resulting death 
sentence; and federal habeas corpus review under AEDPA proved too 
limited to set aside a sentence that resulted from the breaches. 
II. NO QUESTION OF GUILT 
The California Supreme Court described how Payton engaged in a 
horrific assault in a boarding house in which he and his wife once 
lived.12 The boarding house, in Garden Grove, California, was owned by 
Patricia Pensinger, who lived there with her three sons and some 
boarders. One of the boarders, Pamela Montgomery, had been in the 
house only two days, having moved there while her husband was on 
duty with the National Guard. Ms. Pensinger had difficulty sleeping on 
May 26, 1980, and was sitting in her kitchen working on a crossword 
                                                          
 11. Id. at 1040-47. 
 12. Id. at 1039-40. 
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puzzle at about 4 A.M. when she heard the front door open and saw 
Payton enter the kitchen. She knew Payton from his experience as a 
boarder. Payton claimed he had car problems and wanted to talk. Ms. 
Pensinger offered Payton a beer and talked with him for a while. During 
their talk, Pamela Montgomery entered the kitchen, and Ms. Pensinger 
introduced Payton to Ms. Montgomery. After Payton consumed three 
beers, he asked and obtained permission from Ms. Pensinger to sleep on 
her couch in the living room. Ms. Pensinger then retired to her bedroom 
where she fell asleep in a bed shared with her ten-year-old son Blaine.13 
Ms. Pensinger was brutally awakened with two blows on her back. 
She rolled over and saw Payton jump on top of her as he stabbed her 
repeatedly with a knife. Blaine awoke and tried to take the knife away 
from Payton, who also stabbed Blaine. Ms. Pensinger yelled, “Take me, 
leave my son.”14 Payton, who had stabbed her primarily on the face and 
neck, then tried to stab her in the abdomen. On his second and third tries, 
the knife blade bent and would not penetrate. Payton got off the bed, left 
the room, and yelled, “I’m leaving now.”15  
Ms. Pensinger told Blaine to try to escape while she kept Payton 
busy, went into the kitchen, and saw the knife Payton had used lying on 
the counter. Payton grabbed a second knife and stabbed her in the back. 
Blaine ran through the kitchen, and Payton stabbed him in the back as he 
ran past before stabbing Ms Pensinger some more. When another son 
woke up, Ms. Pensinger yelled for her sons to awaken a male boarder, 
and Payton dropped the second knife and fled the house. 
Ms. Pensinger suffered forty stab wounds to her face, neck, back, 
and chest. Blaine suffered twenty-three stab wounds to his face, neck 
and back. Incredibly and fortunately, both survived. This was not the 
case for Pamela Montgomery. She was found dead lying in a pool of 
blood on her bedroom floor clad only in a nightgown that was open in 
the front. She had been stabbed twelve times, six of the wounds in a line 
from above the stomach to the pubic area. Three of the six wounds were 
so serious that each would have been fatal by itself. Some “defense 
wounds” were also visible and appeared to have been incurred when Ms. 
Montgomery tried to defend herself.16 
The physical evidence regarding Ms. Montgomery’s death included 
blood found in various places in the bedroom and in a nearby bathroom, 
a pair of panties entwined around some shorts on her bed, saliva 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 1039. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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consistent with Payton’s17 on the victim’s breast, semen that could have 
been Payton’s in the victim’s vaginal area. Payton’s fingerprint was 
found on a beer bottle in the kitchen.18 
Payton arrived home around 6:15 A.M. His wife, who waived her 
marital privilege not to testify against Payton, testified that when he 
came home his clothes, face, and hands were covered with blood, some 
of which was still wet, and his index finger was cut. She also testified 
that she observed that Payton’s genital area, legs, chest and other parts of 
his body were covered with a “lot” of blood, and his body contained 
scratches and what she described as “fingernail digs.”19 Payton and his 
wife fled town the very morning he came home, and Payton was 
eventually arrested in Florida. 
In addition to the testimony of Ms. Pensinger and Blaine and the 
forensic evidence, the prosecution presented the testimony of an inmate 
who was incarcerated with Payton in the Orange County jail. He testified 
that Payton told him about the crime, and said Payton “raped and 
stabbed a woman, then stabbed a boy and the boy’s mother.”20 The jury 
found that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged.21 
III. PENALTY PHASE EVIDENCE22 
During the sentencing phase of the proceedings, “[t]he prosecution 
presented evidence that in 1973, [Payton] stabbed a woman he was 
living with repeatedly in the chest and arm.”23 The Orange County jail 
inmate testified that Payton told him that the reason he committed the 
crimes in the boarding house was “that he had a ‘severe problem with 
sex and women,’ and that he would ‘stab them and rape them.’”24 The 
inmate reported that Payton said “that all women on the street that he 
seen was a potential victim, regardless of age or looks.”25 
The prosecution and defense stipulated that Payton had two prior 
1976 felony convictions, “one in Idaho for possession of over three 
                                                          
 17. The saliva was also consistent with a large portion of the general population. Id.  
 18. Id. at 1039-40. This was hardly surprising, since he had three beers when he first arrived 
and was talking with Ms. Pensinger. Id. at 1039. 
 19. Id. at 1040. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 1038. 
 22. Id. at 1040. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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ounces of marijuana, and one in Oregon for unlawful consensual sexual 
intercourse with a minor under the age of eighteen.”26 
The defense presented evidence during the sentencing proceeding. 
It relied on the fact that Payton had become a religious person since he 
was arrested and confined in jail. The testimony supporting Payton’s 
sudden conversion came from various sources, including individuals 
who had known him for a long time and some who only recently made 
his acquaintance. 
One of the two witnesses who knew Payton for a long time was his 
mother, who testified that he was “totally immersed in the Lord.”27 The 
other was a minister who believed that Payton’s “recent ‘commitment to 
the Lord’ was sincere.”28 
The witnesses who knew Payton for a relatively short time included 
a mission director who testified about Payton’s “religious conversion 
and the good qualities he exhibited in jail.”29 The mission director 
related that Payton “established Bible study classes in jail, and had 
almost completed an autobiography that had an ‘excellent chance of 
being published in an international . . . Christian publishing house.’”30 
The mission director’s testimony that “[m]any jail inmates ‘respect 
him and trust him and have a confidence in him’” was supported by a 
deputy sheriff who “testified that [Payton] led Bible study sessions in 
jail, and had a positive influence on other inmates.”31 The mission 
director also testified that Payton “hoped to develop a ‘ministry within 
the prison system’” to rehabilitate people.32 Four fellow inmates testified 
about Payton’s beneficial influence in jail. One of them testified that 
Payton had convinced him not to commit suicide.33 
Thus, the defense mitigation evidence was that, at the time of 
sentencing, Payton was not the same man who committed the violent 
acts. He had taken a life, but while in prison had also saved one and was 
helping others to reform their lives as he had reformed his. 
                                                          
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (alteration in original). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1047. 
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IV. THE PROSECUTOR’S ARGUMENT 
The only real battle in the prosecution was over the penalty. After 
offering no evidence during the guilt phase of the proceeding, the 
defense offered most of the evidence during the penalty phase. 
Before the lawyers made their closing arguments in the penalty 
phase, the trial judge held an in-chambers conference. The judge made 
clear that he would give an instruction which followed verbatim the text 
of California Penal Code section 190.3 and was a standard California 
jury instruction.34 The judge’s instruction set forth eleven different 
factors, “labeled (a) through (k), for the jury to ‘consider, take into 
account and be guided by’ in determining whether to impose a sentence 
of life imprisonment or death.”35 
To his credit, defense counsel objected to the instruction and asked 
the judge to more specifically direct the jury to consider evidence of the 
                                                          
 34. Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1436 (2005). 
 35. Id. 1 Cal. Jury Instr., Crim. 8.84.1 (4th rev. ed. 1979) provided: 
In determining which penalty is to be imposed on [each] defendant, you shall consider 
all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case, 
[except as you may be hereafter instructed]. You shall consider, take into account and be 
guided by the following factors, if applicable: 
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the 
present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance[s] found to be 
true. 
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved 
the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to 
use force or violence. 
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction. 
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal 
conduct or consented to the homicidal act. 
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the 
defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his 
conduct. 
(g) Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the 
substantial domination of another person. 
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the 
affects of intoxication. 
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his 
participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. 
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the time even though it 
is not a legal excuse for the crime. 
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defendant’s character and background.36 The prosecution responded with 
its view that factor (k) was not intended to encompass evidence 
concerning a defendant’s background or character. Although the judge 
agreed with defense counsel that factor (k) was a general instruction 
covering all mitigating evidence, the judge insisted upon using the 
standard jury instruction, thereby tracking the precise language of the 
statute.37 The judge said to the lawyers the following: “I assume you 
gentlemen, as I said, in your argument can certainly relate—relate back 
to those factors and certainly can argue the defendant’s character, 
background, history, mental condition, physical condition; certainly fall 
into category ‘k’ and certainly make a clear argument to the jury.”38 
Factor (k) was a “catchall,” in contrast to the greater specificity of 
the instructions that preceded it. It directed jurors to consider “[a]ny 
other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even 
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”39 
The prosecutor clearly did not feel bound by the judge’s 
construction of factor (k). In his closing argument, the prosecutor argued 
“that factor (k) referred to ‘some factor at the time of the offense that 
somehow operates to reduce the gravity for what the defendant did’ but 
not ‘to anything after the fact or later.’”40 The prosecutor used these 
exact words:  
[Factor k] says any other circumstance which extenuates or lessens the 
gravity of the crime. What does that mean? That to me means 
some . . . factor at the time of the offense that somehow operates to 
reduce the gravity for what the defendant did. It doesn’t refer to 
anything after the fact or later. That’s particularly important here 
because the only defense evidence you have heard has been about this 
new born Christianity.41 
                                                          
 36. The United States Supreme Court indicates in its opinion that there was a conference on 
instructions and that defense counsel made the request for a specific instruction on mitigation at the 
conference. Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. at 1436. The California Supreme Court suggests that the 
objection came while the judge gave instructions on the factors to be considered at the close of the 
guilt phase. People v. Payton, 839 P.2d at 1057. Whichever court is correct, the important thing is 
that defense counsel’s request for a specific instruction came before the prosecutor’s closing 
argument. No additional request was made, according to the opinions, after the prosecutor’s 
argument. 
 37. Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. at 1436. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 1 Cal. Jury Instr., Crim. 8.84.1 (4th rev. ed. 1979). The instruction has been amended and 
can now be found at 1 Cal. Jury Instr., Crim. 8.85 (Oct. 2005 ed.). The quoted language represents 
the language in effect at the time of the trial and sentencing proceeding. 
 40. People v. Payton, 839 P.2d at 1047. 
 41. Id. at 1048 (alteration in original). 
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The prosecutor’s argument was constitutionally infirm. A plurality 
of the United States Supreme Court had previously held in Lockett v. 
Ohio that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that “the 
sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character 
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant 
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”42 
Although Lockett was a plurality decision, it built upon another 
plurality opinion in Woodson v. North Carolina,43 which held that a jury 
must be able to consider the character of a defendant in deciding whether 
to impose a life or death sentence.44 After Lockett, it was clear that there 
were six votes on the United States Supreme Court to strike down any 
death sentence imposed in a sentencing proceeding in which the jury 
was not permitted to consider the character of the defendant. A plurality 
opinion of the California Supreme Court had cited Lockett with favor in 
People v. Frierson45 in rejecting an attack on the California death 
penalty as permitting too much jury discretion. Although it is fair to say 
that the importance of mitigation evidence was made clearer not long 
after Payton’s trial by the United States Supreme Court46 and by the 
California Supreme Court,47 the prosecutor cited no authority to the trial 
judge for the proposition that a defendant had no right to offer post-
crime mitigating evidence. 
The only factor to which the defendant’s mitigating evidence 
appeared to relate was factor (k). The trial judge had made clear that he 
believed a defendant had the right to offer post-crime mitigating 
evidence regarding his character and that factor (k) was the factor to 
which such evidence related. The judge refused, however, to make this 
explicit to the jury.48 
Knowing that the judge would only instruct on the statutory 
language, the prosecutor argued to the jury that factor (k) focused solely 
on the crime itself.49 The question is what impact the argument might 
have had on the jury. A fair examination of the precise words contained 
in factor (k) reveals that the prosecutor’s argument tracks the language 
                                                          
 42. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
 43. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 44. Id. at 304 (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.). 
 45. 599 P.2d 587, 608 (Cal. 1979). 
 46. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982); see also Skipper v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-9 (1986) (regarding good behavior in prison).
  47. People v. Easley, 671 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1983).  
 48. People v. Payton, 839 P.2d 1035, 1047 (Cal. 1992). 
 49. Id. 
  
792 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:783 
of the statute well. The language “[a]ny other circumstance which 
extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse 
for the crime” appears to address only “the crime,” which seems to mean 
the crime for which the jury has found the defendant guilty.50 It permits 
the jury to examine any circumstance that “extenuates the gravity of the 
crime” even if the circumstance is not a legal excuse.51 There is nothing 
in this language to suggest that, if the defendant had no redeeming 
qualities at the time of the crime, development of such qualities at a later 
time would extenuate the gravity of the crime. The language says 
nothing to suggest that the jury might consider characteristics of the 
defendant at sentencing that he did not possess when committing the 
crime or that mercy might be warranted at the time of sentencing that 
would not have been warranted when the crime was committed. 
There is no reason to think that the Payton jury was aware of the 
capital punishment jurisprudence that had been developed since the 
Supreme Court struck down the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia,52 
not long after the California Supreme Court had struck down the 
California death penalty in Anderson v. California.53 Nor is there any 
reason to believe that the jury knew about Lockett or the importance the 
United States Supreme Court attached to mitigating evidence. The jury, 
like all juries, depended on the trial judge for an accurate statement of 
the law. 
Surely a reasonable prosecutor would have known that in 1981 it 
was the province of the trial judge to declare what the law is. The 
relationship of trial lawyers to the court should have been as clear then 
as it is today. No counsel may deliberately ask the jury to follow his or 
her view of the law rather than the instructions on the law delivered by 
the trial judge.54 In Payton’s case, the trial judge interpreted factor (k) to 
conform with Lockett and let all counsel know his understanding of the 
factor. The prosecutor nonetheless deliberately argued to the jury that 
factor (k) precluded the jury from considering the mitigation evidence 
upon which the entire defense sentencing presentation relied. This 
                                                          
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1048. 
 52. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). 
 53. 493 P.2d 880, 898-99 (Cal. 1972). 
 54. Gotcher v. Metcalf, 85 Cal. Rptr. 566, 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (“[I]t is axiomatic that it 
is the function of the court, not counsel, to instruct the jurors as to the law of the case . . . it is the 
right of counsel . . . to discuss the law of the case in his oral argument, provided, of course, that his 
statement of the law is correct and is not at variance with instructions on the law which the court has 
advised counsel it will give.”). 
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defiance of the trial judge and instruction to the jury on the law was 
professional misconduct. 
The most that can be said in defense of the prosecutor’s conduct is 
that the trial judge’s explanation of his approach to factor (k) was less 
than clear. When the judge told the lawyers “I assume you gentlemen, as 
I said, in your argument can certainly relate—relate back to those factors 
and certainly can argue the defendant’s character, background, history, 
mental condition, physical condition; certainly fall into category ‘k’ and 
certainly make a clear argument to the jury,”55 the judge almost certainly 
intended to permit both prosecutor and defense to argue that the 
mitigation evidence did or did not extenuate the gravity of the crime as a 
matter of fact (i.e., to decide how mitigating the evidence was). It would 
be a stretch, however, to claim that the prosecutor believed that the trial 
judge was permitting the prosecutor, as an officer of the court, to argue 
that the jury was prohibited from considering the defense evidence as a 
matter of law. The judge told the lawyers he did not believe that factor 
(k) limited the mitigation evidence the jury could consider. But, the 
prosecutor asked the jury to accept his view of law when he argued that 
factor (k) did not cover any post-crime conduct. 
V. DEFENSE COUNSEL’S RESPONSE 
Defense counsel realized this, at least to some extent. He objected 
to the prosecutor’s argument and moved for a mistrial.56 
That was both necessary and proper. But, that apparently is the first 
of only two steps that defense counsel took to protect the defendant from 
the damage of the prosecutor’s argument. 
Defense counsel, in his own closing argument, took the second step 
and argued strongly that Payton’s religious conversion was proper 
mitigating evidence. Defense counsel directly responded to the 
prosecutor’s closing argument that factor (k) permitted the jury to 
consider only crime-related evidence as follows:  
[S]ection (k) may be awkwardly worded, but it does not preclude or 
exclude the kind of evidence that was presented. It’s a catch-all phrase. 
It was designed to include, not exclude, that kind of evidence. Any 
jury . . . that was in the position of trying to determine the fairest 
possible sentences, select them between death or life without 
                                                          
 55. Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1436 (2005). 
 56. Id. 
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possibility of parole, would not only want that kind of evidence but 
would need it to make an intelligent decision.57 
When defense counsel completed his argument, the trial judge declined 
to permit the prosecutor to argue in rebuttal. 
The California Supreme Court seemed to think that defense 
counsel’s response was more than adequate: “[A]ny impact this [the 
prosecutor’s] argument may have had, however, was immediately 
blunted by defense counsel’s objection, which led the court to remind 
the jury that lawyers’ comments were ‘not evidence’ but ‘argument,’ and 
‘to be placed in [their] proper perspective.’”58 
The end result of the closing arguments was that the prosecutor 
argued as a matter of law that the jury was precluded from considering 
the defense evidence under factor (k), while the defense argued as a 
matter of law that the jury was not so precluded. The final decision on 
who was correct on the law was left to the jury. 
The decision to leave it to the jury was, at the very least, partly 
attributable to the failure of defense counsel to take reasonable care. 
Defense counsel asked during the conference on jury instructions for an 
explicit instruction on the mitigating factors that the jury could consider. 
The trial judge declined to give such an instruction, while indicating that 
he expected the lawyers to argue mitigation appropriately.59 Once the 
prosecutor argued as a matter of law that the jury was barred from 
considering the defense mitigation evidence under factor (k), the only 
factor under which the evidence conceivably might fit, defense counsel 
could and should have requested a corrective instruction from the judge. 
The prosecutor erred as a matter of law and invaded the province of the 
court. Yet, defense counsel confined himself to an objection and 
apparently failed completely to request that the judge do his job and take 
responsibility for telling the jury what the law of the case actually was. 
Compounding this failure, defense counsel conceded that section 
(k) was “awkwardly worded,” which might have suggested to the jury 
that defense counsel believed that the jury was required to parse the 
words and decide what meaning to give them.60 Whether or not defense 
counsel intended to say this, the undeniable fact is that defense counsel 
understood that the prosecutor had made an argument as to the legal 
meaning of factor (k), and defense counsel chose simply to join the issue 
                                                          
 57. People v. Payton, 839 P.2d 1035, 1049 (Cal. 1992) (alteration in original). 
 58. Id. at 1048. 
 59. Id. at 1047. 
 60. Id. at 1049. 
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and permit the jury to choose between the competing arguments. In 
short, the prosecutor said factor (k) precludes reliance on the mitigation 
evidence, while defense counsel said factor (k) does not preclude 
reliance. 
The result was that defense counsel, along with the prosecutor, 
called upon the jury to decide a matter that belonged to the judge, as 
though the dispute as to the meaning of factor (k) were a disputed fact. 
There is no way of knowing whether the trial judge would have stricken 
the prosecutor’s argument regarding the meaning of the section had a 
proper request been made and had defense counsel pointed out that the 
prosecutor was arguing law, which was the province of the court. But, it 
is difficult to conceive of a trial judge doing nothing when faced with an 
explicit challenge by the prosecutor to his authority and responsibility to 
define the law for the jury. By failing to challenge the trial judge to do 
his job, defense counsel left the decision as to the meaning of the statute 
to the jury, which had no clue how to choose between the prosecutor’s 
and defense counsel’s reading of the words in factor (k). 
VI. THE TRIAL JUDGE’S FAILURE TO ACT 
If the trial judge had been asleep during the closing arguments, one 
might understand why he failed to act sua sponte to prevent the 
prosecutor from miscommunicating to the jury the meaning of a crucial 
part of the law governing the sentencing, indeed, the only legal issue that 
was likely to matter during the sentencing phase. We know, however, 
that the trial judge was awake and heard the prosecutor’s argument. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, “[t]he [trial] court 
admonished the jury that the prosecutor’s comments were merely 
argument, but it did not explicitly instruct the jury that the prosecutor’s 
interpretation was incorrect.”61 What could the trial judge have been 
thinking? That instruction left the jury with no more information than it 
had before the judge spoke. The jury surely understood that the 
prosecutor was making a “closing argument.” By reminding the jury that 
the prosecutor was making an argument, the judge created an enormous 
risk that the jury would understand that it was to decide whether or not 
to accept the argument just as it would decide any other dispute between 
opposing counsel during closing argument. 
It appears that the judge was reluctant to give a jury instruction that 
was not “standard” and had not yet been approved by California 
                                                          
 61. Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1437 (2005). 
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appellate courts. In giving the unhelpful admonition that he chose, the 
trial judge abandoned his role as arbiter of the law, permitted the 
prosecutor to raise a legal issue as though it were a factual dispute, and 
left the jury to resolve a question of law under a statute that defense 
counsel conceded was “awkwardly worded” and that, on its face, was 
entirely consistent with the prosecutor’s argument.62 
From the reported opinions, there is no way to tell why the trial 
judge barred the prosecutor from making a rebuttal closing argument. 
The absence of a rebuttal meant, of course, that the prosecutor had no 
opportunity to compound his misstatement of the law, but it just as 
surely meant that he had no chance to correct his earlier misstatement. 
Thus, there can be no doubt that in Payton’s sentencing proceeding the 
prosecutor mischaracterized the law, defense counsel offered his own 
view of the law for the jury, the trial judge abandoned his responsibility 
to assure that the jury was provided with an accurate statement of the 
law, and the jury was left to decide which side had the better argument 
without any background in capital punishment cases. 
VII. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT’S RATIONALIZATIONS 
One might suppose that the California Supreme Court would have 
been concerned that, in a case involving a choice between life and death, 
the prosecutor’s misstatement of the law, if believed by the jury, meant 
that it would conclude that it was barred from considering the defense 
mitigation evidence. One might suppose that the highest state court 
would have been troubled that a trial judge in a capital case failed to 
issue a binding instruction on the key disputed legal issue in the 
sentencing stage of the case. There is nary a hint, however, in the 
majority opinion of the California Supreme Court that it understood that 
the jury was asked to decide a matter of law, one that might have been 
dispositive. 
Instead, a majority of the California Supreme Court engaged in a 
series of rationalizations that inevitably minimized the significance of 
the failure of the professionals at trial to adequately carry out their 
responsibilities.63 First, the court reasoned that “[a]ny impact this [the 
prosecutor’s] argument may have had, however, was immediately 
blunted by defense counsel’s objection, which led the court to remind 
the jury that lawyers’ comments were ‘not evidence’ but ‘argument,’ and 
                                                          
 62. People v. Payton, 839 P.2d at 1049. 
 63. The vote was 5-2 to affirm Payton’s death sentence. Id. at 1054. 
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‘to be placed in [their] proper perspective.’”64 This is an amazing bit of 
reasoning. Defense counsel’s objection led the trial judge to instruct the 
jury that the prosecutor was making an argument, and absent any further 
indication by the trial judge, the jury must have understood that its role 
was to decide whether to accept the argument as true. There is no 
recognition in the court’s opinion that the trial judge was obliged to 
instruct the jury on the law, and to make clear that the law was not 
subject to argument, for the lawyers were as bound by it as was the jury. 
Second, the court observed that, after misstating the legal meaning 
of factor (k), “the prosecutor implicitly conceded the relevance of 
defendant’s mitigating evidence by devoting substantial attention to it.”65 
The court quoted as follows from the prosecutor’s closing argument:  
The law in its simplicity is that . . . if the aggravating factors outweigh 
the mitigating, the sentence the jury should vote for should be the 
death penalty. How do the factors line up? The circumstances and facts 
of the case, the defendant’s other acts showing violence, Mrs. 
Pensinger and Mrs. Stone, . . . Blaine Pensinger, the defendant’s two 
prior convictions line up against really nothing except defendant’s 
newborn Christianity and the fact that he’s 28 years old. This is not 
close.66 
The court then concluded that “[o]bviously, this exercise by the 
prosecutor had a point only if it was contemplated that the jury would 
consider defendant’s evidence.”67 
The court’s reasoning is deeply flawed and obviously wrong. The 
prosecutor did not abandon his argument that the jury was precluded 
from relying on the mitigation evidence relating to post-crime events. 
Age is a factor that the statute permits a jury to consider, so factor (k) is 
not needed to deal with age. The fact that the prosecutor referred to the 
defendant’s “new born Christianity,” which presumably was only 
potentially relevant under factor (k), signified nothing more than the 
prosecutor realizing that his legal argument about the meaning of factor 
(k) could be rejected by the jury.68 Thus, it was natural for him to add 
that, to the extent there was any mitigation evidence in the case, it was 
insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.69 In fact, it was 
                                                          
 64. Id. at 1048.  
 65. Id. at 1049. 
 66. Id. (alteration in original). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1048. 
 69. As the dissenting judges pointed out, the prosecutor prefaced his argument to the jury that 
even if defendant's evidence could be considered, it was of little value, by saying, “I don't really 
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essential for the prosecutor to make the argument regarding weighing as 
long as age was a permissible factor for the jury to consider.70 Once the 
jury decided to deliberate, it was entitled under the instructions given to 
it to decide that the prosecutor’s legal argument was correct and that 
evidence that arose after the crimes could not be considered. Nothing in 
the prosecutor’s argument conceded away the legal argument. 
Third, the court reasoned that, “[f]or the jury to have accepted a 
narrow view of factor (k) in this case would have meant disregarding all 
of defendant’s mitigating evidence, since the testimony of his eight 
penalty phase witnesses was all directed to his religious conversion and 
consequent behavior in prison.”71 This is incorrect, however. The jury 
could easily have considered every bit of the evidence presented by the 
defendant and decided piece by piece that it simply did not fall within 
the legal meaning of factor (k), as the prosecutor contended. 
Fourth, the court reasoned that the United States Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Boyde v. California72 supported the conclusion that the jury 
would have understood the legal import of factor (k). In that case, the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that factor (k) operates to “limit 
the jury’s consideration to ‘any other circumstance of the crime which 
extenuates the gravity of the crime.’”73 The Court reasoned instead that 
factor (k) directs the jury “to consider any other circumstance that might 
excuse the crime, which certainly includes a defendant’s background and 
character.”74 The Court supported its conclusion by looking to the other 
sentencing factors that “allow for consideration of mitigating evidence 
not associated with the crime itself, such as the absence of prior criminal 
activity by a defendant, the absence of prior felony convictions, and 
youth.”75 
According to the California Supreme Court, the reasoning of the 
United States Supreme Court also applied to Payton. Its reasoning was 
as follows: 
To be sure, the high court’s holding in Boyde does not prevent a 
defendant from asserting a claim to the effect that prosecutorial 
argument, or other factors, led the jury to misinterpret factor (k). 
                                                          
want to spend too much time on it because . . . I don't think [defendant's evidence] comes under any 
of the eleven factors . . . .” Id. at 1055 (alteration in original). 
 70. Moreover, the fact that the defendant had been drinking was a permissible mitigating 
factor for the jury to consider apart from factor (k). Id. at 1042. 
 71. Id. at 1049. 
 72. 494 U.S. 370 (1990). The Supreme Court divided 5-4 in the case. 
 73. Id. at 382. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 383. 
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However, in evaluating such claims we do not treat comments by 
attorneys as if they had the same force as the trial court’s instructions 
on the law. This is because “[t]he former are usually billed in advance 
to the jury as matters of argument, not evidence, and are likely viewed 
as the statements of advocates; the latter . . . are viewed as definitive 
and binding statements of the law.” 
 
Rather than creating a rule to the effect that incorrect remarks by 
attorneys about the permissible scope of mitigating evidence are 
presumed to have misled the jury, Boyde teaches that there is 
constitutional error only if it is reasonably likely that such remarks led 
the jurors to understand the trial court’s instructions as precluding 
consideration of relevant mitigating evidence offered by the 
defendant. . . . 
 
Applying this analysis to the case before us, we do not consider it 
reasonably likely that the jurors believed the law required them to 
disregard defendant’s mitigating evidence.76 
The problem with the court’s reasoning is that in Boyde, the 
prosecutor—an officer of the court representing the People of 
California—did not misstate the law. No instruction was given to limit 
the jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence. The jury was not asked 
to choose between two competing legal arguments without help from the 
trial judge. Payton was very different from Boyde. In Payton, the 
prosecutor argued to the jury that it was precluded from considering 
post-crime evidence, defense counsel joined the argument, and the trial 
judge left the jury without a binding instruction. The fact that paragraphs 
(a)-(j) repeatedly used the term “the offense” and twice specifically used 
the words “at the time of the offense” might have strongly influenced the 
jury to conclude that factor (k) was a “catch-all” that simply invited it to 
consider any other evidence concerning the offense. The language of the 
instruction as a whole lends support to the prosecutor’s argument, at 
least when considered on a blank slate (i.e., without reference to the 
decided cases on capital punishment).77 
                                                          
 76. People v. Payton, 839 P.2d 1035, 1048 (Cal. 1992) (citations omitted) (quoting Boyde, 
494 U.S. at 378-81, 384). 
 77. Ironically, in People v. Easley, 671 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1983), the Supreme Court of California 
stated that: 
[i]n order to avoid potential misunderstanding [over the meaning of factor (k)] in the 
future, trial courts . . . should inform the jury that it may consider as a mitigating factor 
“any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a 
legal excuse for the crime” and any other “aspect of [the] defendant’s character or 
record . . . that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” 
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The 5-4 majority of the Boyde Court clearly stated “we agree with 
the Supreme Court of California, which was without dissent on this 
point, that ‘[a]lthough the prosecutor argued that in his view the 
evidence did not sufficiently mitigate Boyde’s conduct, he never 
suggested that the background and character evidence could not be 
considered.’”78 This is precisely what the prosecutor suggested in 
Payton.79 Despite the unmistakable difference between Boyde and 
Payton, the California Supreme Court declined to recognize the 
distinction between a prosecutor arguing facts (approved by the United 
States Supreme Court in Boyde) and prosecutors misstating the law, 
which occurred in Payton. It would be an overstatement to say that the 
Boyde majority condemned what occurred in Payton, but it is accurate to 
note that the Boyde majority thought that it was important that a 
prosecutor did not suggest to the jury that it could not consider character 
evidence, and it was undeniable in Payton that the prosecutor went 
beyond a suggestion and argued that the jury was precluded from 
considering post-crime evidence while the trial judge permitted the jury 
to accept the argument if it chose to do so. 
In short, the opinion of the California Supreme Court failed to 
recognize that the jury was called upon to decide law and to do so 
without guidance from the trial judge.80 The opinion also failed to 
recognize that defense counsel, after objecting, joined the argument and 
made it seem that the jury was empowered to choose between the 
prosecutor’s construction of the statute and the defense’s. Most 
                                                          
Id. at 826 n.10 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)). Although the United States 
Supreme Court declined in Boyde to require such an instruction in all cases, California Jury 
Instruction, Criminal, No. 8.84.1 has been formally amended and the present factor (k) instruction 
directs the jury to consider: 
Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a 
legal excuse for the crime [and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's 
character or record [that the defendant offers] as a basis for a sentence less than death, 
whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial]. 
1 Cal. Jury Instr., Crim. 8.85(k) (5th ed. 1988). 
 78. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 385 (quoting People v. Boyde, 758 P.2d 25, 47 (Cal. 1988)). 
 79. Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, discussed infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text, 
quotes from oral argument in Boyde and suggests that the Supervising Deputy Attorney General of 
California cited Payton by name in oral argument as an example of prosecutorial misconduct in 
order to distinguish the case from Boyde. 
 80. As the dissent noted: 
The jurors in this case were laypersons; presumably they were unfamiliar with the 
legislative history of factor (k) or with cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment. Thus, 
they were totally unequipped to decide whether the prosecutor or defense counsel had 
correctly explained to them which evidence they were entitled to consider in deciding 
whether defendant should live or die. 
People v. Payton, 839 P.2d at 1057. 
  
2006] PROFESSIONAL IRRESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL DISREGARD 801 
surprisingly, the opinion failed even to mention that it is the 
responsibility of the judge, not the jury, to decide questions of law. 
VIII. FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW: THE LOWER COURTS 
United States District Judge Manual Real upheld Payton’s 
conviction when Payton sought federal habeas corpus relief, but held 
that the sentencing proceeding was tainted by the prosecutor’s 
argument.81 A panel of the United States Court of Appeals disagreed and 
overturned Judge Real’s ruling as to the fairness of the sentencing 
proceeding.82 A majority of the panel reasoned that “[a]s Boyde 
counsels, prosecutors’ comments lack the force of jury instructions, and 
we cannot say that reasonable jurors in Payton’s case were likely to 
conclude from the prosecutor’s statements, in context of the arguments 
as a whole together with the court’s instructions, that they could not 
consider Payton’s mitigating evidence at all.”83 The majority relied in 
part upon the court’s final instructions to the jury which directed the jury 
as follows: 
In determining the penalty to be imposed on the defendant, you shall 
consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of 
the trial in this case, except as you may be hereafter instructed. You 
shall consider, take into account and be guided by the following 
factors, if applicable: 
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the 
crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.84 
The majority apparently did not realize the extent to which the 
instruction begged the crucial question. The judge instructed the jury to 
consider all evidence except to the extent it was instructed not to. 
Crucial to the jury was whether factor (k) limited or expanded the 
evidence the jury could consider. That was the issue left to argument by 
counsel.85 
                                                          
 81. Payton v. Woodford, 258 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 82. Id. at 916. 
 83. Id. at 916-17. 
 84. Id. at 918. 
 85. Payton cross-appealed and argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
investigate sufficiently, failing to request a court order to compel discovery compliance, and 
improperly conducting voir dire of jurors including disclosure of defense experts, and failing to 
confer sufficiently with him. Id. at 919-22. The court rejected these challenges which were directed 
at the guilt determination. See id. Payton also alleged ineffective assistance during the sentencing 
phase. Id. at 923. He claimed that defense counsel did not adequately voir dire the jury, failed to 
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Dissenting Judge Michael Daly Hawkins identified what had gone 
wrong in Payton’s sentencing proceeding: 
This is a case of compound error involving a serious and repeated 
misrepresentation of law by the prosecutor. The initial error occurred 
when the prosecutor was permitted, in effect, to instruct the jury that it 
could not legally consider Payton’s mitigating evidence—evidence that 
the California appellate courts acknowledge was completely 
admissible. Bad enough that this should happen, but in a nearly 
complete abdication of its responsibility to properly explain the law to 
the jury, the state trial court not only failed to correct the 
misinformation, it permitted the prosecutor to argue his own 
interpretation of a sentencing factor as if it were the law. Because the 
prosecutor’s “instructions” told the jury it must ignore the only 
mitigation evidence that Payton offered, the decision whether to 
consider it made the difference, quite literally, between life and death. 
All this was done without ever correctly instructing the jurors that the 
evidence was fully admissible and that they were required to consider 
it. The result of this deadly combination of prosecutorial misleading 
and judicial abdication “fundamentally affected the fairness” of the 
penalty phase of Payton’s murder trial and violated his due process 
rights.86 
Judge Hawkins compared the prosecutor’s and defense counsel’s 
closing arguments and explained why the jury might well have accepted 
the prosecutor’s construction of factor (k): 
Although defense counsel told the jury it could consider Payton’s 
evidence, he could point to no language in the statute or instruction 
that supported this claim. He instead was left with arguing that factor 
(k) was “awkwardly worded,” but that it did not preclude consideration 
of the post-crime religious conversion. This is in stark contrast to the 
repeated argument of the prosecution, referring to the language in 
factor (k)—“extenuates or lessens the gravity of the crime”—to bolster 
the argument that the language of factor (k) refers only to some fact in 
                                                          
investigate fully the background of a jailhouse informant and Payton’s own background, failed to 
investigate and present evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder, failed to object to the 
prosecutor’s argument that “[w]hat you’ve heard is just some jailhouse evidence to win your 
sympathy, and that’s all,” and cumulatively erred. Id. at 923-25. Payton did not challenge the failure 
of defense to seek an adequate remedy for the prosecutor’s erroneous argument to the jury. 
 86. Id. at 926 (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). Judge Hawkins 
pointed out an important fact not mentioned by the California Supreme Court. “The prosecutor 
continued this theme [i.e., factor (k) did not apply to the defense mitigation] throughout the closing, 
noting later on that ‘You’ve heard no evidence of any mitigating factors’ and then, even later, 
addressing Payton’s evidence but reiterating that ‘I don’t think it’s really applicable and I don't 
think it comes under any of the eleven factors.’” Id. at 927. 
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operation at the time of the offense.87 
Unlike the California Supreme Court, Judge Hawkins recognized why 
the “consider all the evidence” instruction given to the jury could not 
have corrected the prosecutor’s misleading argument. 
More precisely, the jury was instructed to consider “all the 
evidence . . . except as you may be hereafter instructed.” The very next 
instruction the jurors heard was CALJIC 8.84.1 regarding aggravating 
and mitigating factors, including factor (k), which the prosecution had 
told them precluded consideration of Payton’s evidence. The generic 
“consider all the evidence” instruction did nothing to undo the 
damage.88 
Judge Hawkins’ conclusion was the following:  
This is not a case where the prosecutor made an offhand remark during 
the course of trial. The prosecutor’s erroneous argument was far from 
subtle. It was explicit, deliberate, consistent and repeated. Certainly, 
arguments of counsel generally carry less weight than instructions 
from the court. But when the court expressly permits counsel to argue 
the legal meaning of an instruction, without ever instructing the jury 
which interpretation is correct, the arguments of counsel obviously 
take on significant importance. A lay jury is ill-equipped to determine 
which view of the law is correct.89 
The Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the case en banc and, in an opinion 
by Judge Richard A. Paez, adopted the three-judge panel’s decision that 
there were no guilt phase errors, but affirmed the district court’s decision 
with respect to the penalty phase by a 6-5 vote.90 The en banc court 
agreed with the district court that there was error during Payton’s 
penalty phase and affirmed the grant of Payton’s habeas petition.91 The 
court held that AEDPA did not apply to its analysis of Payton’s habeas 
                                                          
 87. Id. at 928. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 929 (citation omitted). 
 90. Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 91. Id. at 815-16. Judge Richard C. Tallman dissented from the sentencing portion of the 
opinion and summarized the dissenting position as follows: 
I respectfully dissent from most of the court's opinion. In Boyde v. California, the 
Supreme Court upheld against an Eighth Amendment challenge the same CALJIC jury 
instruction employed in Payton’s penalty trial. I do not believe the result should be any 
different in this case because it is not reasonably likely that the prosecutor’s incorrect 
remarks led jurors to understand the instructions as precluding consideration of all of the 
defendant’s mitigating evidence, i.e., virtually the entire penalty phase case. Moreover, if 
there was an error, it was surely harmless.  
Id. at 830 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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claims because Payton filed his petition for the appointment of habeas 
counsel prior to April 24, 1996, the effective date of AEDPA. After the 
en banc decision, the United States Supreme Court decided Woodford v. 
Garceau,92 in which it held that cases are “pending” before the effective 
date of AEDPA only if a habeas petitioner has filed an “actual 
application for habeas corpus relief” in district court. Because a petition 
for the appointment of habeas counsel was not enough to make a petition 
“pending,” the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, vacated the 
judgment, and remanded Payton to the court of appeals.93 On remand, 
the Ninth Circuit applied AEDPA to its analysis of Payton’s habeas 
claims and reiterated by the same 6-5 vote its earlier conclusion that the 
district court properly granted Payton’s habeas petition.94 
IX. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE LAST WORD 
The Supreme Court granted review95 and reversed the Ninth Circuit 
by a 5-3 vote.96 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court reasoned as 
follows: 
We do not think that, in light of Boyde, the California Supreme Court 
acted unreasonably in declining to distinguish between precrime and 
postcrime mitigating evidence. After all, Boyde held that factor (k) 
directed consideration of any circumstance that might excuse the 
crime, and it is not unreasonable to believe that a postcrime character 
transformation could do so. Indeed, to accept the view that such 
evidence could not because it occurred after the crime, one would have 
to reach the surprising conclusion that remorse could never serve to 
lessen or excuse a crime. But remorse, which by definition can only be 
                                                          
 92. 538 U.S. 202 (2003). 
 93. Id. at 210. 
 94. Payton v. Woodford, 346 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2003). Judge Tallman again wrote the 
dissent. This time he also relied upon AEDPA:  
Today, six judges of this court announce that the legal conclusion reached by seven of 
their colleagues (plus five justices of the California Supreme Court) is not only wrong, 
but objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established federal law. According to the 
six judges in the majority, those twelve judges were so off-the-mark in their analyses of 
United States Supreme Court precedent that their shared legal conclusion—that Payton’s 
constitutional rights were not violated by the “unadorned” factor (k) instruction—must 
be deemed objectively unreasonable. I respectfully dissent. 
Id. at 1219 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 95. Goughnour v. Payton, 541 U.S. 1062 (2004). 
 96. Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1435 (2005). Chief Justice Rehnquist did not 
participate in the decision. 
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experienced after a crime’s commission, is something commonly 
thought to lessen or excuse a defendant’s culpability.97 
 
That leaves respondent to defend the decision of the Court of Appeals 
on grounds that, even if it was at least reasonable for the California 
Supreme Court to conclude that the text of factor (k) allowed the jury 
to consider the postcrime evidence, it was unreasonable to conclude 
that the prosecutor’s argument and remarks did not mislead the jury 
into believing it could not consider Payton’s mitigation evidence. As 
we shall explain, however, the California Supreme Court’s conclusion 
that the jury was not reasonably likely to have accepted the 
prosecutor’s narrow view of factor (k) was an application of Boyde to 
similar but not identical facts.98 Even on the assumption that its 
conclusion was incorrect, it was not unreasonable, and is therefore just 
the type of decision that AEDPA shields on habeas review.99 
Justice Kennedy wrote “[t]here is . . . no indication that the 
prosecutor’s argument was made in bad faith, nor does Payton suggest 
otherwise.”100 Justice Kennedy also pointed out something not 
previously emphasized in the reported opinions: i.e., when defense 
counsel objected to the prosecutor’s closing argument, the trial judge, at 
a side bar conference, stated that one could “argue it either way.”101 In 
other words, it appears that the trial judge was permitting counsel to 
argue law to the jury and was deliberately refusing to assume 
responsibility for telling the jury the proper construction of factor (k). 
The most surprising part of the majority opinion is its failure to 
reference what it found important in Boyde: “[A]lthough the prosecutor 
                                                          
 97. Id. at 1439. It is not at all clear that a lay person would agree that post-crime remorse 
lessens a defendant’s culpability. Even if it were clear, in none of the opinions in the case is there a 
suggestion that defense counsel argued that Payton’s life should be spared because he suffered 
remorse. Instead, the defense’s argument was that Payton had changed and was a different man. 
There is absolutely nothing in the reported decisions to suggest that defense counsel, the judge or 
anyone suggested to the jury the reasoning used by Justice Kennedy or that such reasoning is 
common among lay individuals. 
 98. It is debatable whether Payton possibly could be fairly characterized as “similar but not 
identical facts.” After all, the prosecutor in Boyde did not argue that the jury was precluded from 
considering any evidence. This was important enough for the Court to mention in its Boyde opinion, 
and important enough, according to Justice Souter’s dissent, for the Supervising Deputy Attorney 
General of California to explicitly distinguish the two cases in his oral argument in Boyde. See infra 
notes 105-106 and accompanying text. 
 99. Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. at 1439-40. 
 100. Id. at 1441. This is somewhat surprising given the trial judge’s statement during the 
discussion with counsel as to instructions that he agreed with defense counsel’s position as to factor 
(k), and the almost certain knowledge that all competent lawyers have that it is the province of the 
court, not counsel, to tell the jury what the law is. 
 101. Id. 
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argued that in his view the evidence did not sufficiently mitigate 
Boyde’s conduct, he never suggested that the background and character 
evidence could not be considered.”102 The ease with which the Court 
dismissed the harm arising to Payton from the prosecutor’s argument is 
astonishing. The prosecutor told the jury factor (k) did not cover the 
defense mitigation evidence, defense counsel chose to argue the point 
and did so rather weakly, the trial judge told the lawyers at sidebar that 
he thought the question could go either way, and the jury had none of the 
training in legal language that lawyers and judges are supposed to have. 
If the trial judge thought either side could prevail in its interpretation, 
why shouldn’t the jury think similarly? As between the prosecutor’s 
argument and the defense’s, the language of factor (k) and its placement 
in an instruction emphasizing the crime and the time the crime was 
committed certainly offer support for the prosecutor’s legal argument 
while providing nothing to help the defense argument. Indeed, defense 
counsel at trial pointed to nothing in the wording that supported his legal 
argument. 
Justice Breyer concurred and wrote that “[w]ere I a California state 
judge, I would likely hold that Payton’s penalty-phase proceedings 
violated the Eighth Amendment.”103 He concluded, however, that 
AEDPA standard required a federal court to find that the California 
Supreme Court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,” and the standard had not been 
satisfied.104 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissented. 
He identified the position the trial judge found himself in when defense 
counsel objected to the prosecutor’s closing argument: 
Although the prosecutor’s argument rested on a perfectly fair reading 
of the text of the pattern instruction, its effect, in the absence of any 
further instruction, was to tell the jury that it could not consider the 
conversion evidence as mitigating. Payton’s lawyer immediately 
objected. He expressed his understanding that the trial judge had 
agreed that consideration of the mitigating evidence was 
constitutionally required and meant to let respective counsel argue only 
about its probative value, even though the judge himself had refused to 
address this essential constitutional issue specifically in any particular 
                                                          
 102. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 385 (1990) (quoting People v. Boyde, 758 P.2d 25, 47 
(Cal. 1988)). 
 103. Id. at 1442 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. at 1443 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2000)). 
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instruction. One would reasonably suppose that the trial judge would 
have realized that the prosecutor’s argument put him on the spot, 
forcing him to correct the misleading statement of law with an explicit 
instruction that the jury was free to treat the conversion evidence as 
mitigating, evaluating its weight as the jury saw fit. It is, after all, 
elementary law, federal and state, that the judge bears ultimate 
responsibility for instructing a lay jury in the law. But the trial judge 
did no such thing. Instead, he merely told the jury that the prosecutor’s 
argument was not evidence. This instruction cured nothing. The 
prosecutor’s objectionable comment was not a statement about 
evidence but a statement of law. Telling the jury that a statement of 
law was not evidence did nothing to correct its functional error in 
misstating the law.105 
Justice Souter focused on the language of the Court in Boyde, which had 
emphasized that the prosecutor had not argued that the jury was 
precluded from considering all the evidence, and wrote that  
[i]f the Boyde majority thus anticipated a case like this one, with a 
possibility of substantial prejudice arising from misrepresentation of 
the law, the Court’s prescience is attributable to the State’s position in 
the Boyde argument: the Supervising Deputy Attorney General of 
California appearing for the State in Boyde urged the Court to see that 
case in a light favorable to the State, in contrast to Payton’s case, to 
which counsel referred by name, as a case in which the prosecutor had 
“misled the jurors.”106 
Four Justices, the majority without Justice Breyer, might have 
reached the same result as the California Supreme Court if they were 
free to engage in de novo review. Justice Breyer and the dissenters 
clearly would have reached a different result but for AEDPA. This is not 
the place to address the merits of AEDPA, for the focus here is on 
professionalism. The important thing is that a majority of the Supreme 
Court was not prepared to say that what happened to Payton should 
never happen when professional lawyers and judges satisfy their 
professional obligations. The 5-2 majority of the California Supreme 
Court failed to appreciate the breakdown of professional standards 
during Payton’s sentencing when it rendered its decision in 1992. 
Thirteen years later, four of eight United States Supreme Court justices 
failed again to do so. 
                                                          
 105. Id. at 1448-49 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 106. Id. at 1449-50 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument in O.T. 1989 at 
29 (No. 88-6613)). 
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X. CONCLUSION 
Five United States Supreme Court justices apparently agreed in 
Payton that it is not deliberate misconduct for a prosecutor to argue law 
to the jury that has not been approved by the trial judge even though the 
argument flies in the face of what the trial judge told the lawyers the law 
was. The same five justices apparently agree that it does not violate 
clearly established Supreme Court precedents for a trial judge to permit 
a jury to decide in a capital case, by weighing competing legal 
arguments, whether it was or was not precluded from considering post-
crime mitigation evidence that might make the difference between life 
and death.107 This speaks volumes about the Court’s view of the state of 
professional standards in this country, those governing both lawyers and 
judges, and it makes a statement as well about the confidence one can 
have in the fair imposition of capital punishment. 
One might have thought that few principles were more firmly 
established in all cases, and with special significance in capital cases, 
than these three: (1) it is the province and duty of the court to state the 
law that the jury is to apply,108 (2) counsel have no right to ask the jury 
to accept as true statements of law not approved by the court,109 and (3) 
trial lawyers and trial judges act unprofessionally when they ask a jury to 
decide a question of law based upon competing arguments of counsel.110 
One might have hoped that the highest court in the largest state of the 
union would have firmly embraced these principles, and that, if it failed 
to do so, the United States Supreme Court could be counted on to do so. 
As it turns out, a majority of both courts failed to do so. 
The title of this Article is “A Grand Slam of Professional 
Irresponsibility and Judicial Disregard.” In the case of William Charles 
Payton, the prosecutor invaded the province of the court and 
misrepresented the law to the jury, defense counsel chose to respond to 
the argument instead of insisting that the trial judge do his job and tell 
the jury what the law was, and the trial judge sat back and permitted the 
lawyers to argue the only legal issue that mattered in the case and 
                                                          
 107. See id. at 1442. 
 108. See, e.g., Gotcher v. Metcalf, 85 Cal. Rptr. 566, 569 (1970). 
 109. Id. California trial and appellate judges indicated prior to Payton’s trial that they 
understood the judge’s right and responsibility to correct erroneous arguments on the law. See, e.g., 
Sparks v. Bledsaw, 49 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252 (1966). Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that 
“misstatements of law are impermissible during closing argument and a positive and absolute duty, 
as opposed to a discretionary duty, rests upon a trial judge to restrain and purge such arguments.” 
Heshion Motors, Inc. v. W. Int’l Hotels, 600 S.W.2d 526, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
 110. See John W. Poulos, The Lucas Court and the Penalty Phase of the Capital Trial: The 
Original Understanding, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 521, 641 (1990). 
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allowed the jury to decide which view of the law to adopt.111 Three 
lawyers acted and none did what he should have done, resulting in a 
triple failure. Add to it the California Supreme Court’s failure (and 
possibly that of half of the United State Supreme Court) to recognize 
how bad the triple failure was and there is a grand slam, professionals 
failing to meet the standards of the profession, and judges disregarding 
their responsibilities. 
That this death penalty case, highly visible and with the kind of 
appellate review not always provided in ordinary cases, ended as it did 
ought to cause alarm about the state of legal standards. Death penalty 
cases are the ultimate adversary contests. It is clear that AEDPA imposes 
serious constraints on federal judges correcting state errors. A violation 
of due process is not enough, even in a capital case, to warrant habeas 
corpus relief. Unless the United States Supreme Court has clearly 
decided an issue, and a state court’s decision is contrary to or 
unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s decision, a habeas prisoner 
will be unable to prevail. It does not matter how unfair a state court 
decision is, even though a death sentence is the result. Surely, in a world 
in which habeas corpus review has been so greatly reduced, it is not too 
much to ask that prosecutors, defense counsel and judges be held in all 
criminal cases, but particularly in capital cases, to adherence to 
professional standards of conduct and to voice our dismay and concern 
when they are not.112 
I hereby voice my dismay and concern. 
QUESTION & ANSWER 
MR. BLACK: Barry Black. Good morning. Thank you for your 
talk, Professor. One question with regard to your position that there was 
prosecutorial misconduct here, let me preface my comments by pointing 
out that Professor Freedman’s view on prosecutorial ethics differs 
substantially from that which we see in common practice. You could 
hold the prosecutor to a much higher standard of proof before he 
proceeded. Having said that, if a prosecutor has before him a statute, 
horrible as it may be, is it not on a lesser standard of the Freedman’s 
                                                          
 111. People v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1164, 1171 (Cal. 1977) (holding that “although a court 
may not instruct an attorney which arguments he shall make and when, it may order him to cease a 
prejudicial, profane, insolent, unconstitutional or other improper argument which threatens the 
integrity of the trial”). 
 112. I was tempted to say “the highest” standards, but after reviewing what happened to 
Payton, I concluded it would be a great step forward to expect adherence to basic standards of 
conduct to which all lawyers should be expected to conform. 
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prosecutorial standard of ethics you could not give, not only province, 
but responsibility to argue it according to exactly the way he did it? 
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: That’s a good question. On the slide 
I had put up, the Supreme Court decided two cases before the trial in 
which a majority of the Supreme Court indicated that a defendant has a 
constitutional right to rely on mitigating evidence, all mitigating 
evidence. So, the prosecutor’s argument was in conflict with the United 
States Supreme Court’s decisions. You’re not allowed to argue against 
the defendant by stating what the Supreme Court has said is 
unconstitutional or prohibited. 
MR. BLACK: So would the prosecutor have to take the position 
that the statute he has before him is unconstitutional? And I mean, I 
would assume he’d be fired if he took that position. 
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: He just has to refrain from arguing 
what’s not constitutional. By the way, as crazy as it is, under the Boyde 
case if the prosecutor had said nothing about what the statute meant, the 
jury might have concluded on its own that it couldn’t consider the 
defense evidence, and the United States Supreme Court said that’s okay. 
That’s what it said in Boyde, and that’s bad enough, but what the Payton 
prosecutor did, he went a step further. He told them—and he is after all, 
as I said, speaking for the state of California. He told them they were 
barred from considering the defense evidence, and the judge said to the 
jury it could consider his argument, so if you think he’s right, you’re 
barred. But, even if the Supreme Court had not spoken on the matter, 
and there had been no law, the DA would still have not been warranted 
in arguing law not approved by the trial judge. And let’s suppose, by the 
way, that for the first time on appeal, the California Supreme Court said 
that was the wrong argument, then you couldn’t say the prosecutor 
engaged in misconduct for ignoring U.S. Supreme Court decisions; the 
argument would be simply error, right? But it ought not to matter, 
should it? In a death case when there is misconduct or error, if it’s the 
wrong law, don’t you think it should matter? 
MR. BLACK: Well, that’s the question. I personally tend to adopt 
Professor Freedman’s approach and being a defense attorney, I’d like to 
see prosecutors stand up and say, you know what, I don’t believe in this 
argument. I have it. I have the law on my side, bad statute as it is, that 
I’m not going to go forward, and I see very few prosecutors doing that 
realistically, but that’s not what we see in practice, and prosecutors want 
to move up the alter on a Sunday being nominated to the Supreme Court 
of the United States and definitely do what they can to get ahead. 
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PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Well, I think that’s the issue of what 
standard we ought to be holding the prosecution to—probably a little bit 
removed. I don’t disagree with you. The point I have raised, number one, 
is that if there was error, the error went to the heart of the trial, and this 
trial was only about one thing. As I said this trial was not about guilt. 
The trial was about whether the jury could consider mitigating evidence, 
and if so decide to spare the guy’s life. If they got it wrong, it was 
because of the prosecutor’s argument. The prosecutor should have 
known the law, number one, but even if the law hadn’t been decided, 
there was error when the prosecutor argued law not approved by the trial 
judge. Whether or not this was misconduct, it was error that was not 
cured by anything that happened at trial. 
MR. BLACK: Right. Thank you. 
PROFESSOR APPLEMAN: This is a little off the topic, but we’re 
talking about—I’m sorry, I’m Laura Appleman. So any discussion of 
prosecutorial ethics, which I’d like to put in quotes, you know, I wonder, 
considering both the Supreme Court and really all courts in the land, it’s 
really a harmless error problem. I’ll admit my bias here, but I practiced 
criminal defense in New York City for five years. But just looking at the 
law as it is, it’s very rare that any sort of the prosecutorial misconduct is 
ever punished. We take the example of Nancy Grace, take the example 
without—leave it up to CNN person who has their own show. She 
actually was chastised by the Fifth Circuit several times for lying about 
witnesses and, you know, having Brady113 violations, and yet this is not 
only—did not impede her career, I think it may sort of, you know, have 
shot her up into the main stream, in terms of prosecutorial ethics, it just 
seems that prosecutors more and more, especially in so many criminal 
defense trials, so many cases are resolved by guilty pleas and by plea 
bargaining that there’s an immense amount of coercion going on, and 
whether it’s state or federal, and I guess, you know, what you’re talking 
about is just, you know, you’re a little removed, but it’s just, for me 
maybe for many criminal defense lawyers, it’s just yet another example 
of how all criminal defendants, whether they’re extraordinarily well 
represented by Martin Weinberg like Martha Stewart or the average 
criminal defense lawyer. I think that ethics is really falling by the 
wayside, I think the courts aren’t doing their job in reversing, in 
chastising. There are very few rules to punish prosecutors besides out of 
the judicial reversal, so I just want to hear your thought on this. 
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PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: You raised several different points. 
Let me address each of them. I’m not one who wants to run around 
campaigning on the theory that all prosecutors are bad or that all 
prosecutors engage in misconduct. I do think there’s been a lowering of 
standards. I think it is true generally that people’s pride in their work, 
and the use of their authority to do the right thing have been—they’ve 
diminished over time. I had lunch with Justice Kennedy—and by the 
way, I chaired the ABA Justice Kennedy Commission for a year, and 
looked at issues he asked us to look at about criminal justice, and I did it 
with great pride, even though my view is Justice Kennedy is in part 
responsible for some of the horrible decisions that have to do with 
criminal justice, and Payton is one of them. This is absolutely one of 
them, writing a majority opinion that couldn’t figure out that one of the 
most basic principles known to the law is that the judge is responsible 
for the law. It is shocking that that is not something that he and the other 
justices thought was clearly so well established that they could overturn 
the California Supreme Court. But, I spoke with Justice Kennedy about 
prosecutions and prosecutorial discretion, and I was surprised. I said 
“well, have you ever read the book The Just and the Unjust?”114 He 
looked at me, he said “James Gould Cozzens.” He actually knew James 
Cozzens’s middle name. Well, I doubt that any of the law students in the 
room ever heard of this book. If you can’t find it in regular print, I urge 
you to read it, go out and get it at a used book store. When I was going 
to law school, and that was not actually when Gutenberg was living, it 
was not that long ago. Back then the reading was Gideon’s Trumpet, The 
Just and The Unjust, and there were a couple of others. Billy Budd also 
still was a favorite. The Just and the Unjust was about a small town 
prosecutor, and I don’t remember if it was actually true or if I want to 
remember it this way, the basic lesson I learned from that book was that 
a prosecutor has a greater chance to do justice for those who are accused 
or suspected of crimes than a defense lawyer, because he has a portfolio 
of cases and the decision not to prosecute is always as important a 
decision as the decision to prosecute. The discretion not to prosecute 
everything gives prosecuting officials the opportunity to make the most 
important decisions they are ever called upon to make, and I tell you, I 
think prosecutors don’t understand that. When I was in the Department 
of Justice, I remember it was Dick Thornberg, the Attorney General, 
who sent out a memo that required that every prosecutor to charge the 
most serious offense possible unless the prosecutor honestly believed 
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that it couldn’t be proved. I thought why would you require that? Why 
wouldn’t you let prosecutors exercise the kind of judgment that you 
would hope they would have, to be held worthy of the title of United 
States Attorney? And by the way, the Attorney General of the United 
States is not anybody. He is the chief prosecutor, the leader of 
prosecutors. Now the decision not to prosecute is as important as the 
decision to do it, and one of the problems we have, is that there aren’t 
any voices, aren’t any voices in the public arena speaking up on these 
issues, because people have been intimidated and there’s a continuing 
war on crime that is very popular. You recall Bill Clinton when he raced 
back to Arkansas in 1992 to preside over the execution of a mentally 
retarded defendant. It was disgraceful, and it sent the wrong message 
about what matters in criminal justice. I didn’t like it when the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission bit the bullet and said let’s equalize powder 
cocaine and crack cocaine—because a hundred times the penalty for 
what are largely African American defendants in one category and white 
defendants in the other violates any notion of equal protection and 
fairness—and the White House ordered the Attorney General to urge 
Congress to overturn the Commission. She did it and we still have the 
crack and powder cocaine disparity. We have this new bill in the house, 
with a death penalty provision, and it diminishes the right to a jury 
trial.115 We have a bill that streamlines procedures in habeas corpus 
cases in the Senate, Senator Spector has put it forward, and it would 
basically and effectively take habeas corpus off the table for any case, 
including capital cases.116 These are all popular things. I haven’t heard a 
prosecutor who has to run for election, stand up and say, well, I have to 
use discretion not to prosecute something, because that’s justice. People 
don’t want to hear it. Society is still afraid of crime. It still sells to be 
tough on crime, and as long as that is the case, then prosecutors get the 
message. The message is, they ought to prosecute vigorously and 
prosecute everybody vigorously. They ought to over-prosecute, and part 
of the result is that, as we all know, we have more criminal statutes than 
in any other country. One of my friends is a state prosecutor in 
Minnesota. He was in a meeting of a group of ABA representatives, and 
they were talking about privacy, and they were talking about 
prosecutorial overreaching, and after a while, he got a little tired of it, 
and he looked around the room. He said, “I just want you to know the 
reality.” He said there are so many criminal statutes that are out there. 
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He said “if you gave me twenty-four hours, I could indict every one of 
you,” and he was serious, and that didn’t mean he could convict us, but 
the indictment itself, we all know, is enough to ruin your name. We 
joked about this yesterday when we talked about Scooter Libby, but I 
believe in the presumption of innocence. I’ll give Scooter his day in 
court. I’m not raising him as an example to condemn the guy, because 
the moment we condemn Scooter without knowing what really 
happened, without giving him a chance for a trial, we condemn 
everybody who’s being indicted by a prosecutor. I would say that I 
thought Patrick Fitzgerald stood up and actually spoke as eloquently as I 
heard a prosecutor speak in many years, and it dearly warmed my heart, 
I don’t know about yours, when he stood there and said I want to remind 
you, he’s presumed to be innocent, and he ain’t going to be guilty unless 
and until a jury of twelve people unanimously agree he is—and he didn’t 
say it was going to happen. It was the most—it was the fairest statement 
I’ve ever heard, and the fact that a guy spent two years with a virtually 
unlimited budget to investigate this, usually produces a gung-ho person 
who wants everybody to convict in their minds the person charged and 
he didn’t do that, and I thought there may be hope out there, there may 
be hope, but I think the truth is, it was so unusual and so unexpected and 
so wonderful, that it was probably the exception that reminded us of the 
rule which is there are not many like him out there and there ought to be 
more. I’m sorry, that’s a long response. [Applause] 
MR. ELOEIRYN: Mark Eloeiryn. I was wondering, since this case 
People v. Payton, and during the case, had anyone challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute itself and why isn’t that a bigger issue? It 
seems to me if the statute were stricken as unconstitutional, then the trial 
court would have to overturn, the whole case would be over. 
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: That’s a really good question, and let 
me point out one of the reasons that I’m hard on the judges here, is 
judges are not supposed to blink and pretend things that happened didn’t 
happen. Lawyers do make mistakes, you know, judges are to call it right 
but your point is in the Boyde case, the California Supreme Court had 
exactly the opportunity to—to indicate that the statute was a problem 
and they ought to have said it. The challenge of that statute was, it could 
be read by a jury to—to bar it from considering the mitigating evidence 
that the defendant has a constitutional right to offer, and the California 
Supreme Court construed it basically to permit what the Constitution 
requires. It said we don’t need a jury instruction to make the law clear. 
We think that jurors would understand and that it doesn’t mean what it 
seems to say, and then the case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
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had a chance to say, come on, in a capital case, whatever the law might 
be in another setting, in a capital case, we can’t run the risk of error here. 
If ever you have to call it so that an instruction has to be correct and has 
to be clear and has to be in context, it is in a capital case. But, the U.S. 
Supreme Court said we agree with the California Court instruction. At 
least the Court left open what would happen if some prosecutor got up 
and argued for a construction of the statute that would make it 
unconstitutional. I mean, they red flagged Payton in the Boyde case. 
Now, I want to add one thing, Boyde was decided long after the 
prosecutor actually made his argument in the Payton case, so it wasn’t 
like the prosecutor disregarded Boyde. That case didn’t exist, but the law 
in California as approved by United States Supreme Court is that you 
can give this statutory language to the jury, and let the jury figure out 
what it means without a further judicial explanation. In Boyde, the Court 
approved an instruction that left the jury sort of grappling with the 
instruction but without anybody arguing that it barred consideration of 
mitigating evidence. It’s another thing entirely to have the spokesperson 
for the state misstate the law as in Payton, and you can see the result. I 
mean, you’re right—your point is well taken—even though there’s 
plenty of evidence that juries don’t understand most of the instructions 
they get. I guarantee you, a jury can understand this instruction: “Ladies 
and gentlemen, in deciding what the penalty should be you may consider 
any and all mitigating evidence, any and all no matter when or what that 
evidence involves, it’s up to you.” Now, I guarantee the jury would 
understand that, but the judge didn’t say that in Payton—the judge 
thought it was the law, and yet he didn’t have the courage—it was more 
important to that judge not to risk giving an instruction that might in 
some way have been in error. I don’t know how he thought it could be 
an error or how the instruction I just crafted here could have been 
erroneous, and who would have complained about it. The defendant 
would have had no complaint and would have been justly sentenced to 
death if the jury imposed that sentence after understanding that it could 
consider all mitigating evidence. The prosecutor couldn’t appeal if the 
sentence were life imprisonment and would have been protected if the 
sentence was death. But a spineless trial judge backed up by—as I say, a 
duplicitous—and I don’t use that lightly—California Supreme Court that 
didn’t want to overturn another death penalty pretended that the penalty 
phase was fair. Some of you remember, two justices on the California 
Supreme Court got booted out of office in an election, and one of the 
arguments against them was that they overturned too many death 
penalties. Chief Justice Rose Bird being one of them. That lesson wasn’t 
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lost on trial judges or on the California Supreme Court. You want to 
think that, when your judges are elected, they are nonetheless insulated 
from public sentiment. But, there is no way that is true; it is sad—sad, 
but true—that they can be influenced by a concern about the public’s 
reaction to their decisions. When you have people who are not returned 
to the court, and the principal campaign against them is the death 
penalty, you send a message to the court, and that message appears to 
have been well understood by the California Supreme Court. Now, the 
U.S. Supreme Court doesn’t have that excuse. They don’t run for 
election. 
MR. MILLER: Hi. Mark Miller. I want to elaborate on the prior 
question, because I thought that the statute that was asking why isn’t it 
unconstitutional is not the state court statute, the state statute, but the 
AEDPA, since the Supreme Court was relying on that basically to 
advocate its responsibility in deciding that case, why didn’t it just turn 
around and say, because the prosecutor is arguing we shouldn’t hear this 
case under the AEDPA. We find that that statute is unconstitutional 
since it’s a death penalty case that’s relevant, the Supreme Court should 
be allowed to hear it and do what they would. 
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: I see. That’s a very powerful 
question. You, of course, sir, are asking about whether or not a statute 
like that involves a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, by the way, has not taken that issue head on. It has spent 
nine years interpreting this awful statute, because it was so badly written 
that the lower courts couldn’t agree on what it meant in many, many 
parts, and there is a serious question about how far Congress can go in 
limiting the writ before it is deemed to be a suspension. The law is not 
very clear on that, because prior to the 1960s, there was very limited 
habeas review of state cases largely because most of the Bill of Rights 
weren’t incorporated against the states. It was only in the 60s, when the 
Warren Court—some people would say created jurisprudence—
expanded habeas corpus. I don’t know. I don’t know, whether this 
Supreme Court will say that there are limits on what Congress can do. 
It’s had several cases where the issue has at least reared its head in 
different settings. You have the terrorist case involving the so-called 
enemy combatant, the citizen enemy combatant Hamdi, and Justice 
Scalia said you can’t detain people unless you charge them criminally or 
you suspend the writ, and Congress hasn’t suspended the writ. Whether 
he thought Congress could suspend the writ in some circumstances he 
didn’t address, but he really said that, if Congress was going to do it, it 
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had to do it clearly.117 I think it’s a serious issue, and it’s probably one 
that the Court may have decide if the current bill that is in the Senate 
actually goes through, because I’m not exaggerating when I say it takes 
away almost anything that a habeas writ might address and the effect on 
federal habeas corpus review is for all practical purposes to take it off 
the table. 
PROFESSOR YAROSHEFSKY: Ellen Yaroshefsky from Cardozo 
Law School. Thank you very much for putting the issues up front of 
accountability, judicial accountability from the center. For people to—
for students who want to look at this case, this in my mind is the tip of 
the iceberg, and I want to give you the opportunity for a second to talk 
about innocence cases. One of things we’ve seen over time, is that these 
kinds of errors occur occasionally in cases, not with an egregious fact in 
allowing—but in cases where people say I didn’t do it. It’s not me. Even 
those kinds of cases we find these kinds of errors and the courts look 
askant. There is—I think the innocence movement around the country 
has probably been most effective in ensuring that we at least spend some 
time looking at these issues and what it raises, I think that this group and 
criminal defenses and others need to think about it more seriously. How 
do we try to ensure greater prosecutorial accountability, not just the 
courts. The disciplinary system doesn’t want the function, they don’t get 
involved in looking at a real prosecutorial misconduct. And I say real, 
because I’m sympathetic to prosecutors who every single day in court 
are accused of misconduct whether in fact it may not be misconduct. 
Bennett Gershman has written a treatise on prosecutorial misconduct, 
and there are many, many errors that are called misconduct, but for the 
real ones, it seems to me if you put in front and center and I think it’s 
important the issue of what responsibility this profession takes for errors 
of prosecutors. 
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Let me answer that with three points, 
then I’ll be done, because my time is up. Number one, one of the 
greatest changes we could make in our system could go a long way, I 
think, to improving prosecutorial performance by eliminating a lot of the 
claims dealing with Brady issues. Those of you who know, Brady 
requires prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence, but the law is, it 
has to be—in order to have a violation it has to be exculpatory evidence 
that in the end might change the result. You got a prosecutor saying to 
herself “I’m going to turn it over or not. No, I don’t think it would be 
important enough to be turned over.” If I were on the Supreme Court, 
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the law would be that a prosecutor must turn over all exculpatory 
evidence to the judge. You can’t hide anything and the judge will decide 
whether or not anything should be withheld from the defendant, and if I 
were judge, I wouldn’t withhold anything that might help the defense. 
The current state of affairs permits prosecutors to make bad calls, and 
makes it difficult for judges to clean up the system. The current situation 
with regard to Brady, more than any other single thing, creates problems. 
By allowing prosecutors to make the call on their own, what we do, 
number one, is to assure that, if the evidence never comes out, nobody 
will know (other than the prosecutor) that a call was made. And number 
two, when it does come out in some cases after the fact, we end up 
litigating these issues of how important the evidence was in fact, and 
then we get make-believe where appellate courts don’t want to overturn 
the convictions that are stale, because witnesses may not be there and 
memories may fade. That’s change number one, point number one.  
Point number two is I think that, as a profession and particularly as 
academics, we need to encourage a dialogue in which defense lawyers 
talk more to prosecutors and not have this sense that prosecutors are 
here, while defense lawyers are there. I’m in line to be the Chair of the 
Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association, and basically 
what I’m intending to do is to continue the Section’s work at getting 
prosecutors and defense lawyers to try and talk more to each other and to 
find more common ground. Justice is what we’re after and justice 
doesn’t always mean winning for the prosecutor or the defense. That’s 
point number two.  
Point number three, this is a great way to end, because it shows you 
the law of unintended consequences. We need to preserve meaningful 
post-conviction review. I’ve been a witness—I’ve been up on the hill 
talking to the Senate and their staff about this proposed habeas corpus 
change. Here is what the bill does, it’s so ironic. The bill basically will 
change the well-known standard that some of you are familiar with, 
cause and prejudice, that excuses certain defense failures to raise claims 
in state court and permits them nevertheless to be heard in federal court, 
and will replace cause and prejudice with a requirement the defendant 
show cause and innocence, which is almost impossible to show. The 
irony here is that in the Senate, they are saying, all you people, all you 
liberals, all you people out there are talking about the innocent people, 
so if the focus is on innocence, that’s where we ought to spend our time. 
That’s where the attention should be. Let’s focus on the innocent, not on 
procedural technicality. I’ve been trying to explain to them the world 
does not have to be divided so that we must choose to care only about 
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the innocent or about anyone whose trial was unfair. People may be 
innocent of the crime of conviction but may technically be guilty of 
something. It is important to get it right. To show you how bad the bill 
was written, the bill said, if you were involved in a criminal episode, you 
can’t get federal review. To be innocent means that you weren’t 
involved in any way in the episode. Consider a hypothetical. A 
defendant is at a football game. Defendant is part of a group. There’s a 
fight. There’s a melee, then finally the defendant hits somebody. 
Somebody else shoots somebody. The defendant is wrongly charged and 
wrongly convicted and sentenced to death for the shooting he didn’t do. 
The defendant is given an incompetent counsel who doesn’t know how 
to defend and it’s a clear Sixth Amendment violation. Under the 
proposed bill, this defendant cannot obtain review in federal court, 
because he was involved in the episode. It doesn’t matter that he didn’t 
do the crime that he was charged with. It doesn’t matter that he’s been 
convicted of capital murder, and it doesn’t matter that he’s going to be 
executed. Innocence now means, not that you’re innocent of the crime 
charged. It means you’re innocent of everything, and let me tell you one 
thing, if you have to be innocent of everything in order to get any relief 
in this world, I don’t get any. [Applause] 
 
